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Someone Writes to the Colonel:  
Judicial Protection of the Right to Survival in Colombia and the State’s Duty to Rescue 
 
Every Friday for twenty-seven years the protagonist of No One Writes to the Colonel 
goes to the Post Office in the hope that his pension check might have finally arrived – to no 
avail. With this never ending wait come daily degradation, hunger and despair, until the end of 
the story where the remote possibility that his dead son’s game-cock will win next Sunday’s 
fight is his only chance of survival.  In the last scene, the Colonel’s ailing wife, who has resigned 
herself to wait until that day, asks him, “In the meantime, what will we eat?” And the Colonel 
answers: “Shit.”1 
 
In 1992 Colombia’s new Constitutional Court decided a similar case. The plaintiff was a 
69 year old man who after a year had not received response to his pension request from Cajanal, 
the National Pension Fund. He had lost his house, unable to pay rent, and was at the time living 
with a son who hardly had the means to support him. He had no resources, and required an 
urgent medical intervention to save his eyesight, but could not access medical benefits without 
the recognition of his status as a pensioner.2 His chances of winning against Cajanal before the 
Constitutional Court were as slim as the Colonel’s cock of winning the fight, since he was asking 
for a writ of protection for a fundamental right that did not exist in the Constitution: the right to 
survive. Against all odds, he won the case. The Court accepted his claim, and decided there was 
in the Constitution an implicit right to survival that derived from Constitutional doctrine on 
human dignity: the right to mínimo vital, an existential minimum (henceforth: right to survival). 3 
 
In the years following this decision, the Court has decided favorably hundreds of similar 
cases, developing a solid doctrine about the justiciability of social and economic rights when 
there is a threat to the plaintiff’s right to survival. While the Court has also decided other social 
and economic rights cases, the vast majority of cases are over this “right to survival,” and in 
these series of cases the Court has developed its doctrine on the State’s duty to rescue, which is 
the central concern of this article. The rule, as developed by the Court, is that social and 
economic rights are justiciable when there is a threat to the right to survival and the State has the 
capacity to prevent serious harm: if both elements are present then the state has a duty to rescue, 
and judicial protection is in order. The Court has used this rule to protect the plaintiff in cases 
where there is a significant delay in the payment of, or in the recognition of entitlement to social 
security;4 delay in the payment of salaries;5 discriminatory dismissal of a pregnant woman;6 the 
                                                 
1 Gabriel García Márquez, El Coronel no tiene quien le escriba, Editorial Norma, Bogotá, 1991. 
2 Colombia, Constitutional Court T-426 de 1992. 
3 The Court has adopted the doctrine whereby the list of fundamental constitutional rights is not exhausted in the bill 
of rights, and that the Court can deduce implicit rights from the bill of rights (derechos innominados). 
4 Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencias de mora en el pago de pensionesT-426 de 1992; T-005 de 1995; T-144 
de 1995; T-147 de 1995; T-198 de 1995, T-202 de 1995, T-287 de 1995,  T-076-96, T-323-96, T-160 de 1997, T-
278 de 1997, T-458 de 1997, T-611 de 1997; SU-022 de 1998; SU-430 de 1998; T-07 de 1998, T-120ª de 1998, T-
143 de 1998, T-297 de 1998, T-330 de 1998, T-553 de 1998, T-559 de 1998, T-259 de 1999, T-1103 de 2000, T-
1205 de 2000, SU-090 de 2000, SU- 1354 de 2000, SU-062 de 1999, T-001 de 2001, T-019 de 2001, T-124 de 2001, 
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lack of provision of health care services,7 and the exclusion of vital medicines and treatments 
from the Mandatory Health Plan. 8  The Court’s innovation in these cases is not merely 
substantial, it is, more importantly I argue, procedural: the Court gives the poor the right to a 
special Constitutional procedure instead of the regular, and for the most part inaccessible, 
ordinary procedure.  In all of these cases, the Court has established that, thus when there is a 
threat to the right to survival, the plaintiff is allowed to ask for a writ of protection of 
fundamental rights (accion de tutela, henceforth: tutela) which is fast and free of costs, that 
forces any judge to drop other business to decide the tutela cases put before him as an urgent 
matter. 
 
This procedural innovation is critically important for an effective enjoyment of legal 
rights. Technically, many of the right to survival cases might be decided favorably through other 
procedures different from that of Constitutional Law, such as labor or civil procedures, but these 
are notoriously long and expensive. By allowing the use of tutela, the Court effectively created 
an extraordinary judicial mechanism, one that takes seriously poor people’s vulnerability before 
power. In a context of chronic lack of application of the law and prohibitive costs of the judicial 
system, the protection of the right to survival through the tutela gives the poor a real chance to 
use the justice system against the abuses of the powerful.9 This mechanism, I will argue, goes 
beyond previous failed attempts to give the poor access to justice. 
 
A procedural innovation might seem like a minor development in current debates about 
the state’s obligation to eradicate poverty, especially in light of the grand philosophical and 
political questions about the nature of the state and of human dignity. However these grand 
debates often ignore the central characteristic of law in poor countries like Colombia, which is 
the chronic and sometimes total lack of enforcement of law, especially of laws that benefit the 
poor.10 This is not a gap between the law in the books and the law in action, but rather the purely 
                                                                                                                                                             
T-398 de 2001, T-400 de 2001, T-405 de 2001, T -433 de 2001, T-444 de 2001, T-203 de 2002, T-1121 de 2002, T-
1097 de 2002, T-099 de 2002, T-910 de 2003, T-905 de 2003, T-454 de 2003, T-435 de 2003, T-390 de 2003, T-547 
de 2004, T-524 de 2004, T-267 de 2004. Sentencias de no pago de la licencia de maternidad:  T-270 de 1997, T-576 
de 1997, T-662 de 1997, T-139 de 1999, T-210 de 1999, T-558 de 1999, T-365 de 1999, T-1620 de 2000, T-205 de 
1999 T-473 de 2001, T-483 de 2001, T-572 de 2001, T-736 de 2001, T-707 de 2002, T-999 de 2003, y T-390 de 
2004.   
5 Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencias de mora en el pago de de salarios: T-146 de 1996, T-166 de 1997, T-
174 de 1997, T-529 de 1997, T-144 de 1999, T-502 de 1999, T-679 de 1999, SU-995 de 1999, T-121 de 2001, T -
132 de 2001, T -399 de 2001, T -418 de 2001, T -435 de 2001, T -436 de 2001, T -438 de 2001, T -458 de 2001, T -
481 de 2001, T -481 de 2001,  T-541 de 2001, T-614 de 2001, T-626 de 2001, T-630 de 2001, T-698 de 2001, T-700 
de 2001 T-725 de 2001, T-734 de 2001, T-1156 de 2001, T-148 de 2002, T-115 de 2002, T-594 de 2002, T-162 de 
2002, T-1023 de 2003, T-1049 de 2003, T-192 de 2003, T-222 de 2003,  T-552 de 2004, T-541 de 2004, T-505 de 
2004. 
6 Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencias T-238 de 1998, T-283 de 1998, T-286 de 1998. 
7Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencias SU 562 de 1999, T-497 de 1997.  
8 Algunos casos son: el tratamiento del SIDA Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencia T-328 de 1998, del cáncer 
T-283 de 1998, con parálisis cerebral T-286 de 1998 que necesitan equipos ortopédicos T-597 de 1993, o 
intervenciones quirúrgicas T-571 de 1998.  
9 The State and, in certain cases, of private entities and individuals. 
10 With this proposal I hope to develop an idea initially presented by Rodolfo Arango: the right to survival is 
Colombian constitutionalist’s contribution to the development of human rights in societies “not well ordered”; that is 
to say, in “societies characterized by structural situations of inequality and the dysfunctionality of democratic 
mechanisms.” However, in contrast to Arango, and more generally in contrast to those who defend the tutela of 
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symbolic existence of large segments of progressive legislation and judicial decisions. Lack of 
enforcement is not a temporary problem that will work itself out, but rather, it is at the core of 
institutional design and legal culture, firmly grounded on the assumption the consequences of the 
law, including its lack of enforcement, is not the concern of lawyers or lawmakers. This allows 
the legal system to continue to reproduce the status quo while at the same its elites adopt and 
adapt fashionable trends in transnational theory on State obligations. The lack of enforcement of 
the law, disguised as a minor problem, reproduces in the XXI century the colonial dictum of “la 
ley se acata pero no se cumple,” (the law is respected but not enforced) which then as now 
served the purpose of allowing elites to ignore inconvenient orders from the Crown, such as that 
of moderating the brutal exploitation of indigenous peoples. Consistently, poor people’s 
impotence before the powerful 11  is hidden under the mantle of progressive legislation that 
enshrines democracy and the rule of law; it is one of the defining experiences of poverty, and 
justifies poor people’s lack of confidence in the law, and their concomitant authoritarian 
aspirations.   
 
I. Basic injustice of the legal system 
 
The injustice of a pension endlessly delayed and, above all, the powerlessness of the 
pensioner, is an example of what I call the basic injustice of the system of justice.  The basic 
injustice is that, in principle, the poor cannot even demand their recognized legal rights because, 
first, the proceedings of the ordinary judicial system are too costly and, second, because in 
conflicts between the poor and the powerful,12 the design of the judicial system, in principle, 
favors the powerful.13 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
social rights, I do not think the contribution of Colombian constitutionalism is to be found in the justiciability of 
those rights, but rather in the effective democratization of the access to justice. Rodolfo Arango, “Introducción” en 
Rodolfo Arango y Julieta Lemaitre “Jurisprudencia Constitucional sobre el derecho al mínimo vital” Estudios 
Ocasionales CIJUS Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá 2002. p7. Para un desarrollo de la posición de Arango, ver 
Arango, Op. Cit. 
11 En este artículo utilizaré las dos categorías “pobres” y “poderosos” sin adentrarme demasiado en definiciones; en 
cambio espero que a través de los ejemplos pueda comunicar el contenido de estas dos categorías para efectos del 
argumento que aquí se presenta. 
12 A diferencia de lo que sucede en la tradición constitucional inspirada en los Estados Unidos, donde los derechos 
están fincados en identidades irrenunciables (negro, mujer, homosexual) en la discusión sobre los derechos sociales 
los derechos están fincados no en una identidad sino en una situación coyuntural. Ello dificulta pensar los derechos 
sociales desde la tradición constitucional estadounidense donde la identidad y la no discriminación son pilares de la 
concepción de los derechos, ya que la teoría está dominada por una larga tradición de conceptualización de 
indicadores de justicia basados en la identidad, pero no en situaciones contingentes como la pobreza. Además, claro, 
influye la ideología individualista y de “responsabilidad individual” del neoconservadurismo dominante. Como 
contraste interesante está la diferencia de principios en la responsabilidad extra-contractual: mientras que en 
Colombia el caso de “un niño que se ahoga” y quien sabiendo nadar no lo salva conlleva responsabilidad, en los 
Estados Unidos no hay deber de rescatar, ni siquiera por parte del Estado, ver De Shaney v. Winnebago County 
Dep.. of Social Services 489 US189, 109 S.Ct.998 (1989).  
13 Esto no sucede sólo en los países pobres.  El artículo clásico de Marc Galanter "Why the 'Haves' Come Out 
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change," 9 Law & Society Review 95 (1974)  describió como esta 
situación ocurre también en los Estados Unidos, y ha motivado muchos esfuerzos de investigación sociolegal y de 
activismo reformista. Ver por ejemplo la edición de 1999 del Law and Society Review donde se recogen una serie de 
artículos presentados en el simposio de la Universidad de Winsconsin del mismo año llamado: Do the haves still 
come out ahead y dedicado a este influyente artículo. 
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This injustice is simply another fact of poverty, which is more than a lack of resources; it 
is also the experience of extreme vulnerability in the face of power (be it state or private power) 
that forces the poor to accept that it is not possible to demand and obtain even that to which one 
has a right.  The daily solution of the poor person, besides resignation, is to turn to networks of 
patronage, nepotism and clientelism, so that in exchange for loyalty, a vote, or a commission it 
will be his patrón or caudillo who intercedes in his favor.  To turn to the authorities in search of 
justice remains a privilege of class, since it requires time and resources, and the poor have 
neither. Therefore, popular culture expresses the profound conviction that the justice system does 
not serve the poor, independently of their legal rights.  Mistrust and fear of the police and judges 
runs deep -this is true not only of the criminal system, but of civil and labor justice as well, due 
to long delays, high costs, and corruption.  
 
In this context, what is the major challenge for institutional strategies that seek, in the 
name of justice, to eradicate poverty?  Clearly it is not the judicial system’s responsibility to lead 
the fight against poverty, since judges have very little capacity to order structural change, no 
capacity to enforce it, and very little capacity to follow up on the actual implementation of lw 
and policies. However, there are some strategies the justice system can adopt in order to be more 
responsive to poor people’s everyday vulnerability before the powerful. One of these strategies is 
to reform the system to provide a better service to the poor, going beyond equal access in order 
to actually privilege poor people’s needs. 
 
One possible strategy to make the needs of the poor a priority is to have a procedural 
mechanism that allows judges to compensate the poor for their vulnerability in their conflicts 
with the powerful. This mechanism would be similar to affirmative action in so far as it takes 
into account the plaintiff’s condition without any pretension of neutrality before factual 
unbalances in power and resources, in order to achieve a more level playing field. This proposal 
might seem completely unrealistic, but it is not a fantasy: it actually exists in Colombia in the 
tutela for the protection of the right to survival. 
 
1.  Strategies to For a More Just Justice System 
 
Poor people’s lack of access to justice is a problem in rich countries as in poor, but the 
institutional capacities to change this situation differ, depending on factors such as state 
structure, legal culture and available resources. This context must shape any consideration of 
judicial strategies to eradicate poverty in societies where the state is weak, the judicial branch is 
even weaker, social inequality is abhorrent, and the poor comprise the majority of the population.  
This is to say, it is not the same to ponder the institutional strategies to eradicate poverty in 
Germany as it is in Colombia, or in the United States as in Ecuador; legal scholarship about the 
state obligation to eradicate poverty, the role of the judiciary, social rights, judicial power, etc., 
should not be conducted as if it were possible to discuss these issues in a “transnational” manner 
without taking location into account.14 
                                                 
14 Si bien es cierto que es común reconocer la especificidad del contexto, es raro, y por lo general difícil, desarrollar 
las implicaciones de esta situación para la teoría constitucional. En Colombia, por ejemplo, la discusión académica 
sobre la responsabilidad de la justicia frente a los pobres ha girado en gran parte en torno al concepto del Estado 
Social de Derecho consagrado en la Constitución de 1991 y a la justiciabilidad de los derechos económicos y 
sociales en sintonía con la teoría constitucional transnacional. Las consideraciones sobre las diferencias de contexto 
 5
In this article I am specifically concerned with the unfairness of the justice system in 
Colombia, assuming that these considerations might be applicable to other societies with similar 
problems. In Colombia, strategies to change this situation are not new. Nevertheless, these 
strategies have not taken seriously poor people’s needs in the conflicts with the powerful. These 
strategies have been mainly three: judicial reform, including alternatives methods for dispute 
resolution; free legal services for the poor, and the last is a new constitutionalism, the origin of 
the tutela.15  
 
1.1 Judicial Reform and the Poor 
 
The last decade or so of judicial reforms are often justified by ordinary people’s lack of 
access to justice; nevertheless, the principal objective is not to help the poor, and the reforms 
attempt to do so only indirectly.16  According to the logic of reform, although lack of access is 
important, it is not its main concern; instead, judicial reform is a tool for development, with the 
poor as eventual beneficiaries. For the reformers, the ineffectiveness of the system is not only the 
result but also the cause of under-development, not because the poor suffer, but rather because it 
hinders investment and free markets. Therefore, the principal justification of judicial reform is 
that economic development needs the security of contractual performance, maintenance of 
property rights, and control of corruption, in order to benefit private investment and better 
functioning of a market economy, and the poor only indirectly.17 
   
The transplant of U.S. alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, ADR, is an example of 
the way judicial reform has been carried out. The introduction of ADR was intended to alleviate 
docket congestion, not to benefit the poor: its main intention is to free judges to handle more 
important affairs than poor people’s minor concerns. Furthermore, by not recognizing power 
differentials between parties in a conflict, the law actually ends up leaving the poor in a more 
vulnerable position than they were before.  What is most revealing of the spirit of the ADR law 
is that the great beneficiaries have been Chambers of Commerce who implemented successful 
negotiation and mediation programs for a fee, geared at small and medium businesses. Poor 
people in search of justice are faced with a free and mandatory judicial mediation hearing in 
many of their concerns, where they must negotiate without legal guidance or representation, and 
any agreement they reach is legally enforceable. 
 
1.2 The Poor as Beneficiaries of Legal Aid Schemes  
                                                                                                                                                             
y su impacto teórico son mínimas. Por dar dos ejemplos accesibles a través de las en bases de datos electrónicas, ver, 
por ejemplo: Manuel José Cepeda, “Judicial Activism in a Violent Context: the Origin, Role and and Impact of the 
Colombian Constitucional Court” 3 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 529 y Rodolfo Arango “Basic Social Rights, 
Constitucional Justice and Democracy” 16 Ratio Juris 141 (Junio 2003). 
15 Public interest litigation is practically non existent except for some environmental protection suits, but whatever 
little there is happens within the frame of new constitutionalism. 
16 Ver Thomas Carothers “The Many Agendas of Law Reform in Latin America” en The Rule of Law in Latin 
America: The International Promotion of Judicial Reform, editado por Pilar Domingo y Rachel Sieder, Institute of 
Latin American Studies, London, 2001. Joseph Thome “Heading South but Looking North: Globalization and law 
Reform in Latin America” 3 Wisconsin Law Review p.691 (2000); Linn Hammergren Fifteen Years of Judicial 
Reform in Latin America: Where We are And Why We Haven’t Made More Progress at http://www.undp-
pogar.org/publications/judiciary/linn2/sources.html. 
17 According to this logic, the poor will benefit in two ways: reform will benefit them because there is more 
employment and better services, and they will benefit from a judicial system that works better overall. 
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Debates about access to justice usually involve legal aid as the main strategy to benefit 
the poor.18 Unlike judicial reform, legal aid benefits the poor directly.  The premise is that the 
poor need lawyers to vindicate their rights.  The project is then to offer them access to free legal 
services, often through university legal clinics, but also through other forms of free legal services 
offered by state agencies.  In Colombia, for example, law students are required to render free 
legal services for a year through University Legal Centers in order to graduate. There are also 
specialized entities like the Ombudsman or Labor Inspectors that offer individual legal 
orientation and sometimes representation for the poor.  Nevertheless, these legal services are 
perennially overburdened and understaffed, and their quality, at least in the case of law students, 
is questionable. 
 
Even though the legal services strategy seeks to directly benefit the poor, its proponents, 
like the proponents of the judicial reform strategy, do not take basic injustice seriously, since 
they do not suggest transformation of the system, but rather offer resources (lawyers) to the poor 
in order to humanize the situation without altering its structure: the justice system remains the 
same. Even proposals that consider institutional reform as part of access to justice programs 
argue for improvement to the present syst, such as more efficient judges or more expedient 
procedures, but do not consider substantially transforming ht system to explicitly benefit the 
poor. 
 
1.3 The Poor in the New Constitutionalism 
 
The new constitutionalism that has emerged in Colombia since 1991 includes, as an 
important aspect of its anti-formalism,19 a commitment to the protection of human rights.  Direct 
application of the rights enshrined in the new document revolves around the concept of the 
Social Rule of Law, according to which social and civil rights are and should be integrated.  
Even so, in the new constitutionalism, social and economic tights, even if justiciable in some 
cases, remain essentially “programmatic.”  
 
In principel the Constitutional Court follows international law doctrine in the sense that 
economic and social rights are programmatic except for a very basic minimum core of rights. 
The content however of this core in Colombia generally has depended on the state’s capacity to 
afford the duty in question. For the Constitutional Court, especially from 1997 on, with decision 
SU-11120, the central problem of the justiciability of social rights is state capacity, assuming 
always that state resources are scarce. Already in its first right to survival decision, the Court 
insisted that justiciability of social rights is limited by scarcity of resources, and that it was not 
                                                 
18 See for example Alejandro Garró “Access to Justice for the Poor in Latin America” in Juan E. Méndez, Guillermo 
O´Donell and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America University of 
Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1999. 
19Diego López, Teoría impura del derecho: la transformación de la cultura jurídica latinoamericana. Editorial  Legis, 
Bogotá, 2004. 
20 Esta sentencia resuelve el no pago de pensiones por parte de una entidad departamental, donde el no pago tiene 
una relación directa con la corrupción de los gobiernos departamentales anteriores que habían dejado al 
departamento sin dinero para pagar. La Corte insta al ejecutivo a resolver el problema estructural, e insiste en la 
importancia de la prudencia judicial frente a la incapacidad de la entidad estatal de pagar las deudas. 
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the judge’s task to establish priorities in the distribution of scarce resources, but that of the other 
branches of power.21  
 
With this line of argument the Court, in spite of opening an interesting path for social 
rights is still limited in its definition of social rights, a limitation that is typical of new 
constitutionalism. The Court, even though it speaks of a core of social rights that are enforceable, 
still defines both this core and in general social rights in terms of scarcity, as it is in international 
human rights law. Therefore, unlike civil and political rights, social rights are by definition 
justiciable only if the state has the capacity (resources) to guarantee the right. 
 
In other words, social rights exist if the state has the resources, while civil rights exist 
even if the state does not have the resources. Limitations in the implementation of civil and 
political rights are not conceived as a matter that affects the definition of the obligation, but as a 
matter of budgeting. For example, the incapacity of the Colombian state to protect its citizens 
form irregular armies is not a matter of scarce resources that change the state’s obligation, but 
rather a problem of the implementation of a basic state obligation. Another example is prolonged 
detention without trial when there are no resources to assign judges to decide criminal cases. 
This is an established right, as are free elections no matter the cost to the state, or the protection 
of private property through the police and the criminal system, both extremely expensive for a 
poor country. But when scarcity is an obstacle for state provision of the right to education and 
the right to health, it stops being a problem of lacking the resources to uphold an obligation, and 
turns into a problem of lacking an obligation because the state has no resources. 
 
This frame for understanding state’s obligation to eradicate poverty reflects the links 
between new constitutionalism and cold war liberalism, which seriously limits its commitment to 
the poor. New constitutionalism, in spite of its commitment to a social rule of law (Estado Social 
de Derecho) generally adopts the institutions of a liberal state as the natural and necessary form 
of democracy, and as the best system to materialize aspirations to justice.22 Commitments to the 
“social” aspect take second place before the idea of a State whose main purpose is to guarantee 
civil and political liberties. In spite of this tendency from within the heart of new 
constitutionalism appears, as an experiment with the institutional possibilities of democracy, the 
tutela for the right to survival, an institution that allows for the imagination of a different type of 
state, one committed to eradicating poverty within a human rights frame. 
 
2.1 Tutela as a democratic experiment 
 
Roberto Unger’s democratic experimentalism is a remedy for this apparent necessity of 
institutions that constraints any opposition. Through democratic experimentalism societies can 
                                                 
21 Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencia T- 426 de 1992. 
22 Hay dos desarrollos conceptuales de la Corte que van en sentido opuesto: el primero, es la afirmación de la Corte 
que los derechos sociales tienen un núcleo básico y un área de desarrollo progresivo, y que el núcleo básico es 
justiciable (concepto de “erradicación de las injusticias presentes”). Esta doctrina se crea a partir de un caso donde la 
Corte ordena al Estado brindar las vacunas básicas a niños de escasos recursos en Bogotá. Ver Corte Constitucional 
Sentencia SU -225 de 1998, reiterada en T-177 de 1999, T-772 de 2003 y C-671 de 2002. El segundo es el concepto 
del “estado inconstitucional de cosas” que permite ala Corte dar órdenes estructurales por ejemplo para ordenar 
condiciones dignas para todos los presos de una cárcel. Sentencia  T-714 de 1996, T’025 de 1994, Sin embargo, esta 
no es la tendencia del grueso de la jurisprudencia, donde la capacidad del estado es el tema central.  
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expand democracy’s institutional repertoire beyond the narrow limits of liberalism in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. 23  Democratic experimentalism is premised on the absence of one 
necessary institutional form for democratic ideals, proposing instead a wealth of possibilities. 
The goal is to experiment, evaluate and learn from different institutional practices to constantly 
breach the gap between ideals and practice without having to reach a point of crisis for 
transformation. In the concrete problem of law and poverty, the ideological triumph of the 
United State’s development model has led to a liberal hegemony that constraints the possibility 
of imagining states that make the needs of the poor a priority without invoking the specters of the 
cold war. Institutional experimentation then offers a measure of freedom to rethink the possible 
shapes of democracy and the market in poor countries. 
 
Therefore, I suggest the Colombian experiment with tutela for the right to survival be 
examined as an institutional experiment that comes from new constitutionalism, but at the same 
time pushes its ideological boundaries. This experience, which has to a certain degree been 
contingent and erratic, can even so be the basis for thinking of ways the legal system can take 
seriously the vulnerability of the poor before the powerful. 
 
 Tutela for the right to survival, is an interesting institutional experiment, because it 
transforms the systems institutional practice by giving the poor a privileged access to justice, and 
forcing the judge to leave behind the pretension of neutrality and instead assume an active role in 
favor of the poor. This is achieved through four ways of democratization. The first, common to 
all tutelas, is to make justice more accessible for the poor by eliminating procedural barriers. The 
second is to empower the judge to decide according to equity and not to formal equality. The 
third is to acknowledge poverty as a situation that gives the right to ask for a writ of protection. 
The fourth, a result of the previous three, is that it distributes a scarce good: access to justice.  
 
III. Access to justice through procedural reform 
 
The procedure for tutela brings the administration of justice closer to the poor through its 
accessibility, speed, and efficacy.  It is very accessible for the poor because any ordinary judge is 
allowed to hear tutelas; any day or hour is possible; and the procedure is free, fast, and does not 
require an attorney.24  Furthermore it gives the judge flexibility in the evaluation of evidence and 
even the possibility of inverting the burden of proof, alleviating the costs for the plaintiff.25 It is 
quick because it is conducted with the criterion of urgency; the judge has ten days to give the 
ruling and the action receives expedited treatment.26  It is effective because it provides the judge 
latitude to craft remedial orders broader than those than the plaintiff requests, and because 
includes the possibility of arrest for contempt of a judicial order.27  These characteristics have 
                                                 
23 Roberto Unger, Democracy Realized The Progressive Alternative:. Verso, London and New York 1998. 
24 Colombia, Constitución Nacional Art. 246 y Decreto 2591 de 1991 Art.1 y 14.  
25 Se puede tutelar el derecho “prescindiendo de cualquier consideración formal y sin ninguna averiguación previa si 
algún medio de prueba del que se pueda deducir grave o inminente violación o amenaza del derecho.” El juez 
“puede fundar su decisión en cualquier medio probatorio” y “puede proferir el fallo tan pronto llegue al 
convencimiento” sin necesidad de practicar las pruebas solicitadas. Colombia, Decreto 2591 de 1991 Art.18. 
26 Colombia, Decreto 2591 de 1991 Art. 15 y Art.29. 
27 Colombia, Decreto 2591 de 1991 Art.52. 
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resulted in the high acceptance of tutela, and thus in the high number of tutelas: 133, 273 in the 
year 2002, for a country of 40 million people (the Court revised 1,123 of these). 28 
 
Other similar procedures for the direct application of constitutional rights, such as the 
Mexican amparo or the Chilean orden de proteccion, share some of the characteristics the make 
the tutela such an attractive institution. However, they are almost all limited in the causes that 
allow plaintiffs to ask for a writ of protection of a constitutional right: perhaps the most striking 
characteristic of the Colombian tutela is judicial discretion to decide whether or not a 
constitutional right is being threatened, and decide which rights can be protected through 
tutela.29 This discretion exists even when there are other legal procedures that the plaintiff could 
follow, if the other procedures do not fully protect the threatened right. 30  
 
III.2. The Introduction of Equity to a Civil Law System 
 
But perhaps the most transformative advantage of tutela, which gives significance to its 
accessibility, quickness, and efficacy, is that it empowers the judge to impose a criterion of 
equity.31  In a context where formal justice has traditionally prevailed over substantive justice, 
and judges were supposed to apply the law mechanically, the regulation of the action is thus an 
important transformation of the conception of the judge’s role; for the first time, it awards her a 
social role, responsible for the equitable consequences of her rulings. 
 
This transformation of the judge’s role has various aspects.  First, tutela forces the judge 
to recognize the disequilibrium of power between the parties as the central fact of injustice, and 
assigns her the responsibility of balancing the situation, especially when the government is the 
defendant,32 but also when powerful private individuals are accepted as defendants.33  Second, 
                                                 
28 Manuel José Cepeda, Op. Cit. p. 599. 
29 Colombia, Constitución Nacional Art. 86. No se requiere que el derecho tenga un desarrollo legal para protegerlo 
pues la Constitución es directamente aplicable. Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencia  T-002 de 92, y T-406 de 
92). La tutela procede en razón de la naturaleza del derecho y no por que esté en la lista de la Constitución (T-418 de 
1992). Incluso se acepta que hay derechos fundamentales que no están positivizados (Constitución Nacional, Art.94) 
y cuyo reconocimiento procede en la realidad de cada caso cuando se afecta la dignidad humana y la persona se 
encuentra en situación de indefensión (T-801 de 1998, T-881 de 2002). 
30 Colombia, Constitución Nacional, Art. 86: “Toda persona tendrá acción de tutela para reclamar ante los jueces, en 
todo momento y lugar, mediante un procedimiento preferente y sumario, por sí misma o por quien actúe a su 
nombre, la protección inmediata de sus derechos constitucionales fundamentales, cuando quiera que éstos resulten 
vulnerados o amenazados por la acción o la omisión de cualquier autoridad pública. La protección consistirá en una 
orden para que aquel respecto de quien se solicita la tutela, actúe o se abstenga de hacerlo. El fallo, que será de 
inmediato cumplimiento, podrá impugnarse ante el juez competente y, en todo caso, éste lo remitirá a la Corte 
Constitucional para su eventual revisión. Esta acción solo procederá cuando el afectado no disponga de otro medio 
de defensa judicial, salvo que aquella se utilice como mecanismo transitorio para evitar un perjuicio irremediable. 
En ningún caso podrán transcurrir más de diez días entre la solicitud de tutela y su resolución. La ley establecerá los 
casos en los que la acción de tutela procede contra particulares encargados de la prestación de un servicio público o 
cuya conducta afecte grave y directamente el interés colectivo, o respecto de quienes el solicitante se halle en estado 
de subordinación o indefensión.” 
31 Colombia, Corte Constitucional, T-002 de 1992. 
32 Private parties can be defendants when they provide a public service or when there is agross unabalnce of power 
that amount to powerlessness (indefension) of the plaintiff. Constitución Nacional Art. 246 
33 Colombia , Decreto 2591 de 1991 Art.5 y Art.42. Ver además Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-134 
de 1994   
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aside from recognizing inequality, the action provides the judge with broad capabilities to correct 
it.  For example, it offers her great flexibility in the assessment of evidence, including the 
possibility to reverse the burden of proof case-by-case.34  Additionally, there is no strict limit to 
the rights or situations through which one can proceed, and the judge has the authority to 
examine case-by-case if there is a violation of rights; in this way, the ample catalogue of rights 
protected by tutela can always be amplified by the courts.35         
The Constitutional Court has further empowered judges in various decisions. The Court 
itself has significant power; it has discretion as to which tutela it hears on revision, and its 
revision has legal power similar to that of precedent in the common law system. 36 Constitutional 
Court judges have more independence since, unlike other magistrates, they are elected by 
Congress instead of by judicial career. Plus, for purely contingent reasons there has been a 
significant presence of progressive judges who have used their control of the tutela docket to 
create a constitutional jurisdiction mindful of material justice.37  The result has been a relative 
transformation of the legal culture.38   
 
2.2 Procedural rights for the poor 
 
Besides the advantages of tutela in general, the tutela of the right to survival is of 
particular interest to the poor since it gives constitutional status to threats to their subsistence: the 
poor have a constitutional privilege of asking for a writ of protection when the breach of a 
powerful entity or individual’s obligation toward them threatens their survival. This is procedural 
right to enforce the law through a tutela is granted only to the poor, and effectively gives them 
access to a fast, accessible, efficient special procedure where the judge must decide according to 
equity and not to formal equality. 
                                                 
34 Se puede tutelar el derecho “prescindiendo de cualquier consideración formal y sin ninguna averiguación previa si 
algún medio de prueba del que se pueda deducir grave o inminente violación o amenaza del derecho.” El juez 
“puede fundar su decisión en cualquier medio probatorio” y “puede proferir el fallo tan pronto llegue al 
convencimiento” sin necesidad de practicar las pruebas solicitadas. Colombia, Decreto 2591 de 1991 Art.18. 
35 Colombia, Constitución Nacional Art.. 86 No se requiere que el derecho tenga un desarrollo legal para protegerlo 
pues la Constitución es directamente aplicable. Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencia  T-002 de 92, y T-406 de 
92). La tutela procede en razón de la naturaleza del derecho y no por que esté en la lista de la Constitución (T-418 de 
1992). Incluso se acepta que hay derechos fundamentales que no están positivizados (Constitución Nacional, Art.94) 
y cuyo reconocimiento procede en la realidad de cada caso cuando se afecta la dignidad humana y la persona se 
encuentra en situación de indefensión (T-801 de 1998, T-881 de 2002). 
36 Ver pie de página 34. 
37 La jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional estable un precedente obligatorio para los fallos de tutela de todos los 
jueces del país. Este poder, en contra del principio general de que el juez se guía por la ley y no por la jurisprudencia 
se basa en las siguientes fuentes: primero, la Constitución Nacional establece en su artículo 243 que “Los fallos que 
dicte la Corte en ejercicio del control jurisdiccional harán tránsito a cosa juzgada constitucional.” Segundo, el 
Decreto 2591 de 1991 en su artículo 33 reglamenta la revisión de los fallos de tutela. Tercero, en sentencia C-018 de 
1993, la Corte Constitucional, declarando la constitucionalidad del articulo 33 del Decreto 2591 de 1991, estableció 
que la jurisprudencia de la Corte en material de tutela establece la “cosa  juzgada constitucional,” lo cual quiere 
decir que tiene efecto erga omnes y  no solo interpartes, en virtud del principio de igualdad y del articulo 243 de la 
CN. Por lo tanto las revisiones de tutela obligan para los casos futuros y no sólo para el caso concreto. 
38 Sobre esta transformación, ver: Diego López, op. Cit. Sobre su impacto para los movimientos sociales, ver 
Mauricio García y Rodrigo Uprimny en Boaventura de Sousa Santos y Mauricio García Villegas, eds. Emancipación 
Social y Violencia en Colombia, Editorial Norma, 2004. Sobre su impacto para la vida cotidiana, ver Esteban 
Restrepo “Reforma Constitucional y Progreso Social: La ‘Constitucionalización de la Vida Cotidiana’ en Colombia” 
en Roberto Saba (ed.), El Derecho Como Objeto e Instrumento de Transformación, Buenos Aires: Editores del 
Puerto, 2003, pp. 73-88.  Ponencia  del SELA 2002. islandia.law.yale.edu/sela/restrepos.pdf  
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In order for any type of tutela to proceed the consequences of he action or inaction of the 
defendant must be grave for the plaintiff (the situation must be urgent) and the plaintiff must be 
helpless before the defendant. 39 In tutela to protect the right to survival urgency and helplessness 
are a consequence of the lack of resources to survive, that is of poverty. Therefore, the Court 
turns down those cases where the plaintiff isn’t poor, considering there is no urgency, because 
the consequences are not serious, or because the plaintiff has not claimed or given any evidence 
to support the claim that his or her survival is threatened. 40 These two criteria, helplessness and 
urgency of the situation, are of central importance to appreciate the contribution of tutela of the 
right to survival for the poor. 
 
The tutela of the right to survival carries the recognition of inequality to the economic 
sphere.  Unlike the ordinary judge who is limited by the official “blindness” of justice, the judge 
hearing the claim is allowed to see that, if not for his rapid intervention, the poor person is in 
reality defenseless against the powerful.  She is also able to determine that this radical 
helplessness is rooted precisely in the lack of available resources necessary for survival when the 
government or a particular entity, having the capacity and the obligation to act, does nothing.  
For example, the judge may recognize the inequality between the senior citizen that lives off of 
his pension and the public entity that does not pay him; between the worker and the company 
that is late in paying salaries; between the person without the resources to pay for cancer 
treatment and the insurance agency that denies him coverage.   
 
Besides being able to appreciate defenselessness, the judge responds to the urgency of the 
situation by extending the criteria of urgency of tutela to contemplate poverty: for the Courte 
there is urgency when the plaintiff has no other means of subsistence different from disputed. 
Thus poverty transforms the lack of enforcement of the States duty (or of a private party in 
certain cases) in a matter of urgency where the judge must decide the cases in equity. 41 
 
2.3 Redistribution of justice instead of access to justice 
 
It is a well-known fact that in a weak and poor state, access to justice is a privilege.  The 
investment in justice requires important resources, and the demand exceeds its capacity to 
respond.  In order to prioritize the poor when the situation threatens their subsistence, the tutela 
of the right to survival offers a form of distributing this scarce resource (the service of justice) in 
a realistic and just manner.  Realistic because it must take into account the real scarcity of the 
service of justice, which in theory is for all, and just because it prioritizes the urgency and 
helplessness of the poor.     
                                                 
39 Ver, sobre criterios de indefensión y subordinación en la tutela contra particulares: Sentencias T-333 de 1995, T-
190 de 1994, T-498 de 1994. 
40 Por ejemplo ver las sentencias T-001 de 1997, T-123 de 1997, T-126 de 1997. 
41  El criterio de urgencia es explorado y justificado por Rodolfo Arango como el elemento central de la 
justiciabilidad de los derechos sociales. Ver Arango Op.Cit. y Rodolfo Arango. “Los derechos sociales 
fundamentales como derechos subjetivos” Pensamiento Jurídico N. 8 Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Políticas, 
Universidad nacional Bogotá 1997. “El Mínimo Vital como índice de justicia entre particulares” en Antonio Barreto 
editor, Derecho Constitucional Perspectivas Críticas Universidad de los Andes y Editorial Legis Bogotá 2001. 
Protección Nacional e internacional de los derechos humanos sociales en Ciudadanía y derechos humanos sociales, 
Alonso MA y Giraldo J eds. Escuela Nacional Sindical, Medellín, 2002. 
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     It often seems that distributional analysis ignore judicial services as a state provided 
service, one that competes for budgetary allocations of scarce resources just as health care, 
national security or education do.42 Nevertheless, justice is a public service, and access to justice 
an issue of the distribution of scarce resources, like any other action that results in a state 
expenditure in a poor country. 
 
When faced with a scarce resource, the government faces the problem of providing the 
service in accordance with a criterion of distributive justice.  In Colombia, for example, the 
public schools only educate those children from the poorest groups in the population, and they 
demand proof of poverty43 before awarding spots in the school (which are very scarce).  The 
middle and upper class then must resort to private education. Similarly, only the poorest people 
have access to subsidized health insurance, while the rest must pay for insurance. With a 
criterion of distributive justice, the government’s principal obligation is to provide services to 
those who cannot fend for themselves, and to hope for the autonomy of those that have resources 
to subsist.   
 
Nevertheless, in the case of judicial services something very different happens.  As in 
education and health, the rendition of the service depends on the available resources, but there is 
not, as in the other areas, consciousness of scarcity.  To the contrary, there is a denial of the 
scarcity, with the idea that justice is a service that should be rendered to all.  To make matters 
worse, one of the consequences of the system’s design is that the poorest people not only fail to 
receive preferential treatment, but are also in practice excluded from the service.  It excludes 
them first since they do not have the means to pay attorneys or to sustain a legal action, and it 
also excludes them because their claims are “minor claims” that generally do not have priority, 
and are diverted to mandatory mediation hearings. 
 
The tutela of the right to survival instead allows for a prioritization of judicial services 
that follows the logic of distributive justice.44  Under tutela the legal process that guarantees a 
poor person’s legal right receives preferential treatment and must be decided quickly, and 
according to equity. The judge is empowered to avoid procedural requirements, including rules 
about the burden of proof, in order to protect substantive justice.  This is one advantage for the 
poor, but also for the state that must prioritize its scarce resources to offer judicial services.45    
 
                                                 
42 Como sucede con los otros servicios, los ricos pueden privatizar su acceso al servicio, y de hecho lo hacen en su 
conflictos entre ricos, por ejemplo con la firma de acuerdos de acudir a tribunales de arbitramento, o a través de los 
servicios de negociación de las Cámaras de Comercio, o de las negociaciones y arreglos entre abogados, donde el 
uso de los tribunales se evita o se usa tan solo instrumentalmente. Los pobres, como sucede con los otros servicios, 
no tienen muchas alternativas viables fuera del servicio del estado, y sobretodo no tienen alternativas legales. (Por 
ejemplo, acudir a un tribunal de arbitramento es una alternativa legal pero acudir a un padrino poderoso no lo es.) 
43 Por ejemplo el recibo de pago de de los servicios públicos, que están subsidiados para en los barrios más pobres, 
indicando el “estrato” de la vivienda. La Corte declaró que este arreglo en la sentencia C-566 de 1995. 
44  Mientras que la justicia compensatoria busca regresar al estado de cosas anterior al conflicto, la justicia 
distributiva busca cambiar el estado de las cosas para que sea más equitativo.  
45 N.B. en esta sección me refiero a los recursos del estado en el servicio de justicia, no a los recursos del estado en 
general, o en otros aspectos como salud o educación. A ello me referiré más adelante en el artículo, al examinar el 
problema de los recursos del estado como demandado en la tutela por mínimo vital, que es diferente a los recursos 
del estado como proveedor del servicio de justicia. 
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3.  Limits and Problems of the Tutela of the Right to survival as an Institutional Strategy 
Against Poverty 
 
In spite of these advantages, the tutela of the right to survival also presents a series of 
limitations that should be taken into account when evaluating its contribution as an institutional 
strategy.  These limitations can be divided into three groups of problems: the problems of state 
capacity to assist the poor; the problems of the abuse of the tutela; and the problems of judicial 
powerlessness in the face of structural injustices.  Each of these problems has aspects that have 
been considered in debates about the justiciability of social rights as aspects that arise from the 
specific practice of the tutela for the right to survival.  I will try to limit myself to these latter 
problems while recognizing that, in a way, these are problems that have also been debated in 
broader contexts.  
 
3.1 The (In)ability of the State to Rescue the Poor 
 
The first problem with the tutela of the right to survival is the judge’s difficulty in 
establishing whether the state is able or not to provide assistance, and therefore, whether or not 
the state has the duty to rescue.  The Constitutional Court confronts this difficulty on a case-by-
case basis instead of providing a general rule. In most cases the Court has sought the certainty 
that a budgetary allocation existed or should exist to cover the expenditure.  While there are 
exceptions, in the majority of tutelas for the right to survival the judge orders the payment of 
state debts. Obviously in cases involving social security or salaries, the budgetary allocation 
should exist, since they are debts that the government has acquired—subjective, concrete 
obligations and not general programmatic obligations. 46 Even the amplification of the list of 
medicines and services is backed by a budgetary allocation that covers unforeseen expenditures 
of the health system.47 This tendency might respond either to the Court’s inability to determine 
otherwise whether or not the state has enough resources, or to a lack of political commitment to 
the poor; its critics have advanced both explanations, and both are entirely plausible. 
                                                 
46  Antonio Barreto argues that judicial power in the tutela does not match judges’ limited capacity to 
understand the financial aspects of public entities. Barreto’s criticism is concentrated on the probative criterion that 
the Court uses to determine if the government does or does not have the resources to assist the plaintiff.  In general, 
he says, what happens is that, by failing to follow economic and financial reasoning that would allow it to determine 
if an entity has the resources to guarantee social rights, the Court simply stops accepting the lack-of-resources 
defense rather than examining and questioning it.  Mauricio García, for his part, considers that this judicial 
reasonableness makes the Court les progressive than it is otherwise thought, since the majority of the cases do not 
create a right but rather order a payment based on a right already recognized. Antonio Barreto. “Amparo 
Constitucional de los Derechos Sociales- A propósito del carácter social de la acción de tutela.” En Derecho 
Constitucional Perspectivas Criticas. Uniandes y Tercer Mundo Editores Bogota 2001. Mauricio Garcia, Op. Cit. En 
consecuencia la Corte no es realmente activista, ya que actúa dentro de los parámetros de la justicia compensatoria, 
en lugar de ejercer una justicia verdaderamente distributiva. Y por lo tanto no tienen un efecto social importante En 
un artículo anterior expuse mi diferencia con esta apreciación de García, argumentando que esta acción de 
cumplimiento sui generis sí es socialmente significativa, y sí refleja un criterio de justicia distributiva.  Si bien estoy 
de acuerdo en principio con la aspiración de un mayor activismo creo que García no tiene en cuenta el efecto 
distributivo de la democratización del acceso a la justicia señalado arriba, y desarrollado en: Julieta Lemaitre “La 
redistribución del acceso a la justicia: análisis de las sentencias del mínimo vital” en Rodolfo Arango y Julieta 
Lemaitre “Jurisprudencia Constitucional sobre el derecho al mínimo vital” Estudios Ocasionales CIJUS Universidad 
de los Andes, Bogotá 2002. 
47 Esta es función la asume el Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantías a través de la subcuenta de compensación al 
régimen contributivo. Ver artículo 218 de la ley 100 de 1993 art. 218 y Decreto 1283 del 23 de julio de 1996 Art. 1.   
 14
 
3.2 Abuse of Tutela 
 
The abuse of tutela action occurs when it ceases to be a mechanism for safeguarding 
rights and becomes an instrument of other interests.  Perhaps the worst situation in this sense is 
the appearance of a bureaucratic tutela, when public officials as for it as an extra-official 
requirement for state action.  Thus it becomes in some sectors one more bureaucratic 
requirement in the process of compelling state action.  For example, in some groups, like 
pensioners from certain entities, it is clear that whoever does not have “his tutela” does not 
receive his pension. Likewise, some health care providers are reluctant to provide a costly 
service, and prefers to provide one that is less costly but also less effective or more invasive (for 
example it provides surgery rather than radiation therapy for certain types of prostate cancer), 
unless the patient has “her tutela.” Thus, it goes from being an exceptional mechanism to being 
an everyday, bureaucratic mechanism.  This is evident not only from the anecdotal data collected 
from various forums but also from the very high number of claims, which leads one to think that 
the defendant entities have not changed their behavior. 
 
3.3 The Powerlessness of the Justice System Against Structural Injustices  
 
The repetition of the same type of claims and in many cases against the same entities 
brings us to the second problem of the tutela, which is that the judge’s power is limited by 
structural injustices, by which I mean injustices that are neither exceptional nor occasional but 
rather those that correspond to institutional dynamics deeply rooted in society.  This judicial 
limitation has at least two causes. The first cause, and perhaps the most obvious, is that decisions 
are made case-by-case and so the judiciary is not designed to affect generalized situations.  What 
happens then is that the judiciary is inundated with repeated claims against the same type of 
institution or even against the same institution.  Even at the Constitutional Court, which controls 
its own tutela docket, there is a constant increase in the number of decisions that are revised to 
“reiterate a line of jurisprudence.”   
 
The Constitutional Court’s efforts to confront this limitation represent significant 
innovations in the use of judicial power in our legal tradition.  For example the Court has gone 
beyond the inter-partes effects of judicial decisions to create broader orders that do not apply just 
to the parties before it but also to those similarly situated. 48 Additionally, it has tried dispatching 
orders directed toward the entities responsible for general situations, giving them time frames 
and specific measures to follow. In spite of these innovations, it is evident that problems persist 
and that new institutional innovations are needed, especially to address the Courts incapacity to 
follow up on its own structural orders. 
 
The second cause of the tutela action’s powerlessness before structural injustice is that 
there are large groups of the population who have very little access to the system.  Against the 
structural injustice of the de facto exclusion of these groups, it is also ineffective.  It is true that it 
has democratized the access to justice, but in any event its use requires a minimum of material 
and cultural resources.  For example, even though tutela is free and does not require an attorney, 
                                                 
48 Para una explicación de los tipos de efectos de las sentencias, ver: SU 1023 de 2001 y T-203 de 2002. 
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it still has costs related to transportation and lost work days.49  Additionally, the person must 
have minimum cultural resources to interact with the professional judicial environment, and a 
minimum consciousness of and confidence in the legal process.  This is perhaps why tutela is not 
used, or is used very little, by the most vulnerable groups of the population, like for example the 
indigent, boys and girls, rural peasants, or the internally displaced population.50  Paradoxically, 
these are the people whose situation is the most urgent and who are the most defenseless. 
 
4.  Conclusion: Colombia as an Institutional Laboratory? 
 
It may seem strange that a Colombian institution provides a positive example, especially 
of the legal system. After all, tutela originates in a society in crisis where vast social inequalities, 
appalling rates of daily violence, a limited democracy, persisting armed conflict, the corrupting 
effect of the drug and arms trade, and the deterioration of social indicators apparently condemn 
its institutions to failure.  Nevertheless, this situation of permanent crisis also has a positive 
aspect, and it is that it sets up an incentive for institutional experimentation.  The constant 
denunciation of institutional failure is a challenge to the complacency of the elites, and leads to 
the legitimacy of a permanent search for alternative solutions.  In this sense Colombia could be a 
regional laboratory where not all that is produced is inevitably doomed to failure, but rather to 
the contrary, where institutional products could be new and useful solutions for common 
problems. 
 
 The point however is not to reproduce elsewhere tutela for the right to survival in the 
same form as it exists in Colombia. As we have seen, this institution also has serious problems, 
and further evaluation of its impact is still lacking. In spite of these problems, its advantages 
have made it an interesting experiment in the search of institutional solutions to eradicate 
poverty.  Its limitations and problems can be resolved in part through institutional design, for 
example, by making repeated claims more costly for defendants.  Perhaps during the next few 
years of institutional experimentation in Colombia some of these alternatives will come to light. 
 
To conclude, I want to insist on the importance of regarding access to justice as access to 
a scarce resource and, consequently, recognizing the distributive impact of the tutela of the right 
to survival.  This democratization of the access to constitutional justice permits us to correct, at 
least in part, the basic injustice the poor face in their conflicts with the powerful.  This results in 
a change of priorities in which the predicament of the poor—their helplessness and the urgency 
of their situation—and the injustice of the government that can intervene but does not—become 
the most important business of the day for the judge.  In Colombia, as in most of the region, 
development, which is supposed to solve the problems of poverty, is much like the Colonel’s 
                                                 
49 El gasto de transporte sobretodo es una preocupación importante para las personas pobres: el costo de los dos 
buses (o más) que hace falta tomar para llegar al juzgado supera el costo del almuerzo del día. Como estudiante de 
derecho una de las situaciones que más me dejo en claro lo excluyente del servicio de justicia es el de un caso que 
conocí donde la madre no llevó a la hija violada a la práctica forense sino tres días después de ocurrido el hecho 
pues no tenía dinero para el transporte público (dos buses de ida y dos de regreso para cada una). Varios 
funcionarios de Medicina Legal confirmaron que era frecuente el caso de las personas que a la salida del examen 
forense piden limosna para poder tomar el bus de regreso a su casa.  
50 Es cierto que hay sentencias de la Corte Constitucional que favorecen a estos grupos poblacionales. No me refiero 
sin embargo a los grupos como tema, sino al uso de la tutela por los miembros de estos grupos. 
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pension: we keep waiting for it, to no avail.  But if development does not arrive, in the meantime 
at least in Colombia many Colonels receive their pensions thanks to the tutela. 
